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"He Forgot" :
Young Children 's Use of Cognitive Explanations
for Another Person 's Mistakes
Bradford H. Pillow

Northern Illinois University
Suzanne B. Lovett

Bowdoin College
Children, ages 4 and 5 years, and adults were asked (a) to explain a >IOI) charader's
incorrect search for a desired object, and (b) to explain the source of :.he charac erignorance or false belief concerning the object's true location. The character either
(a) did not receive information about the objed's location, (bl receJVed tniorma on
about the object's original locatron, but not about a sub>equent change oi loca ·on,
lc) received information but searched for the object after a delay, or (d rece· -ed
information about the object's location, but was engaged rn another actwt
\-hen
the information was presented. With increased age, there was an inc.reas.t> in e planations that referred to perceptual experience or cognitive acti\ities a lhe source oi
the character's ignorance or false belief. By age 5 years, children shtfted be \'een
explanations that referred to perceptual experience or to the cognttlve act 'Illes oi
forgetting or attentional focus, depending upon the ctrcum~tances tn which t :e
incorrect search occurred. During the late pre>chool "ears a conception o cogntuve
actrvities as contributing to knowledge and belief becomes mt ra ed m o chtldre ,
conceptual framework for explaining human adion.

The past decade of research on children's "theor\' oi mind· 'laS
established that preschool children conceptualize human a , ion in me"talistic terms. That is, by 3 or 4 years of age, children begin to understand that other people experience mental state such a_ ··no ledge.
ignorance, beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions; that ano• er perBradford H. PHfm,, Department oi Psychology; Suzanne B Lovett. Departmefl1 ol
Psychology.
The author~ are grateful to the children, teacher'>. and paren
made this re earch JX>~•fble, and to Shawn Robelb ior hi a~sUance '
da col edJOll·
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on' mental tate ma ·differ from the child' own mental tate; and that
mental tate influence a per on' actions. Thu , the once prevalent view
that prior to age 7 or 8 ~ear • children relv on e ternal, ituational
cau e· rather than internal, psychological cau e to e plain human action is no longer tenable (Bart ch
Wellman, 1989; Miller
loi e.
1989). At the arne time, re earch on ocial cognitive de\elopment ha
hift d from an emphasi on inve. tigating children' use of general principl of cau al rea oning, uch a the di counting principle, to an emphasi- on in e ligating the knowledge ba e underlving children'- cau al
attribution (Fia,ell
1iller, 1998; 1iller Aloise, 1990).
In particular Wellman and Bartsch {1988) propo ed that\ oung children and adults hare a ba ic b lief-de ·ire irame\\Ork for rea oning
about the c.:1u e of b havior. Withm children's simple belief-de-ire
iram \\Ork, action are een to r ult from d ire and belief : D _ire
often are
n to be deri\ d from phy iological tat .., or emotion . and
beli fs often are een to re ult irom perceptual e perience . Wellman
(19 0) iurth r propo ed that a more elaborated under:tanding of mental
functioning and human action d \elop later in childhood. Thi n ore
elaborated tramework include b th a greater variet of concept· and
n w lin · among core concepb. For e ample, in addition to realizing
that b li f d rive from perceptual
p rience, adulh al o r alize that
cogniti\e activitie , uch a reasonmg, rememb ring, and forg tting, can
in uen e beliei....
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mer & Hartl, 1991), and even 3-year-olds use iniormation about beliei
and desires to predict actions tWellman & Bartsch, 1988) and emotional
reactions 1Stein & Levine, 19891.
Although preschool children's use oi simple beliei-desire rea~ning
has been studied extensively, subsequent elaborattons of child en ' ~ e. planatory frameworks have been investigated \Cry little. Vellman ( 1990)
proposed an elaborated framework to characterize older children's and
adults' reasoning. Thb elaborated framework includes a concept of
thinking that consists oi a set oi proces-es, such as reasomm!, remembering, learning, and imagining, that contribute to the formation oi belief;;.
Wellman (1990) did not specify the age at which this more elaborated
framework might begin to appear, but he did -.u ge. t that a concep•ion
of the mind as an active information processor rna , be-.!in around 6
years of age (see Chandler, 1988; Pillow, 1988: and Ta;lo , 1988 tor
similar proposals). Thus, an understanding oi cognitive proces· · i~ central to thb more elaborated beliei-de ire framework. lntegratin concepts of cognitive proces_es into an elaborated belief-de. ire framC"or ·
is an important step because it would allow children to explain ~eem
ingly anomalous events.
For example, con ider the following scenario. John pu' hi: lecture
notes in hb briefca e, but a iew minutes lat r h loo · for the not on
his desk. On the ba-:.is of his perceptual e ·perience, john hould belie\e
that his notes are in hi') briefcase. Ther fore, hi aaion appear o con·
flict with the belief that he should have d n ed from hts percep ual
experience. Und rstanding that cognitive proc
, a ..,eJI a perceptual e ·perience, contribute to behef· would allow children o
he
thi. incon.istency by mferring that John forgot that h pu hL not - '"
the briefca·e. In th pr ent tud , we mve.tigated child n' referen<: to cognitive proc es, especially forgetting and I
explain , nother per on' mi take .
tudte of childr n' under tandtn of th t rms ·~""r>nllhi''f".
uforget" suggest that 4- ear-old may und rst nd th
am
or l _e
m ntal erbs. Although 'Nellman and johnson (1979 ·ound that 4- .arold do not appreciat that both r memberin and fo
tn entatl ha ·
ing had prior knowledge, but in t ad eem to thin hat "'
refer to correct! ' iinding a hidden obj
and tha .. •
incorrect search, t vo mor rec nt tudt
u
that und rstand th k . f tur of r m m rin
nd i r '•
Fl, v II (19 4 r ported th t ,.,..h n a ked which oi \:1> char:
hom clatmed to be ignorant of , n obj ' I
th chara t r "ho pr 10 I h d
4-rear-old ch
location r~th r than th hard r v.h h d

Children\

piano).
fow
Iron I

C~niti\'e
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the origins of false beliefs or ignorance by referring to perceptual experience, selective attention, or forgetting, and they should u e different
explanatory constructs as circumstances warrant.
In the present study, children and adults were asked to explain why
the protagonist of a story searched for a desired object in an incorrect
location. The circumstances leading up to the search were varied to make
certain explanations more or less plausible in different stories. Participants could explain the protagonist's incorrect search b • referring to the
protagonist's mental state or mental processes. At a fairlv basic level,
these mentalistic explanations might refer to a protagonist's knO\\ ledge
state; for example, the protagonist's ignorance or false belief concerning
the object's true location. More elaborate mentalistic explanations would
explain the specific source of the protagonist's ignorance or ial e belief.
We were particularly interested in (a) children's ability to pro,•ide these
elaborate explanations that referred to the source oi a protagonist's
knowledge state and (b) children's ability to provide explanation that
referred to the protagonists' perceptual experiences, such as not seeing or
not hearing crucial information about the object's location in . ome situations, and to provide explanations that referred to the protagoni ts' cognitive activities, such as forgetting the object's location or not pa 'ing
attention to information about the object's location in other situations.
Perceptual explanations for incorrect search are more piau ible
when a protagonist lacked perceptual access to information concerning
the desired object's final location. Ho\\ever, cogniti ·e e planation· are
more plausible when information about the object'· location ' 'a- perceptually available to a protagonist, but the protagom t nonetheless
acted as if he or she were unaware oi that information. For e ·ample,
when the protagonist had never seen where the desired object \·as
hidden, incorrect search may be explained by referrino to the prota onist's lack of perceptual access to the visual information. li ·ewi e, if a
protagonist had been unable to hear a spoken me_:age concernin~ the
object's location, the protagonist's lack of perceptual acces: to the meosage provides an explanation for incorrect search. In contra'>!, 1f the
protagonist previously had seen where the obje<.1 va- hidden and considerable time had elapsed before the protagonist attemp ed to find it,
then claiming that the protagonist had forgotten the object' locat1on
provides a more plausible explanation ior incorrect .:earch than doe'
appealing to lack of perceptual acces<.. Similar! •, if the proa oni;;t had
been told of the object's location immediately before ·earching for it,
but was engaged in another activity when thi verbal m
e \\ ~
provided, failure to attend to the mess, ge \\Ould be a more plau~ible
explanation for the protagonist's erroneous ~earch. There ore. torie..;
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were created so that perceptual explanations were more piau ible for
some stories and cognitive explanations were more plausible for others.
METHOD

Participants
ineteen young 4-year-olds (M = 4;2, range 4;0 to 4;6---10 girls, 9
boys 20 old four-year-olds (M = 4;9, range 4;7 to 4;11-13 girls, boys), and 20 five-year-olds <M = 5;4, range 5;0 to 6;0--11 girls, 9 boys
from daycare centers in the greater Portland, Maine, area participated.
Most children were European American and middle cia s. T\\elve college undergraduates (8 women, 4 men) also participated.

Materials
Several difierent dolls, a dollhouse with furniture, and a tov school
building were used to act out brief storie . Several small container· (e.g.,
boxes, jars, toy bureaus, bowl with lids) and various small object- (e.g.,
a toy cat, toy dog, hat, gum, candy) that could be hidden in the container were used to enact hiding events in the stories. In addition, a ca sette
tape player with a small set of headphones (made with small stereo
earplugs) that tit the dolls' heads, and a tov "video game" (a .mall
etch-a-sketch toy) were used as props.
There were eight storie· in the main task and t\vo warm-up _torie-;.
In the warm-up stories, the protagoni t doll knew \·vhere the hidden
object wa located. In the visual access warm-up story, the doll put an
object in one of two boxes. In the auditory acces.., warm-up torv, the
Protagonist doll did not see where another doll put an object, but was
told the object's location by the other doll. In both .;torie , the protagoni t tated th,lt he or she wanted the hidden objed and then moved
toward the correct hiding place. \Varm-up storie.., were intendecl to farniliari.w children v-:ith the procedure by pre.,enting a simple e\ent that
hould be eas • to comprehend, but ,.. ould not te.1ch children the appropriate r -.ponse to the main task . tories.
Th 'eight stories used in the m,1in task were similar to the warm-up·,
With two kev difference : (a) the nature of the protagonists' acce:s to
inform tion about the desired obje t'.., location' a~ varied aero ·_tori _,
and (b) lthough the protagoni-.t tated a d sire ior the objed, he or . he
th n earched for it in the wrong lo .ation. Ther • vere four perceptual
" stori . In two of the perceptual
tori anci iour ( ogniti a
the protagoni t did not
the d ... ired object'- location
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(visual stories) and in the other two perceptual access stories the protagonist could not hear a spoken message about the object's location
(auditory stories). In addition, in one visual story and one auditol) story,
the desired object was placed in a container where it remained throughout the story (single location). In one visual story and one auditOI)' story,
the object initially was placed in one container and later moved to
another location (change of location). Single-location and change-of-location stories were included to create two different visual stories and
two different auditory stories. However, the desired object's location
was not a variable of interest and was not included in the analvses
reported later. In brief (see the Appendix for full stories), in the 'isual
stories, the protagonist was at school when another character either (a)
placed the desired object in a container at home or (b) mO\ed the object
to a new location. In either case, the protagonist did not see the desired
object's final location. In the auditory stories, the character who either
(a) hid the desired object or (b) moved the object to a new location,
verbally described its location, but because the protagonist was listening
to loud music with headphones covering her ears, she could not hear
what the other character said (nor could she see the object being hidden, because her back was turned to the containers).
In the cognitive access stories, information about the desired object's location was perceptually available to the protagonist, but the
protagonist acted as if he or she was unaware of that information. In two
of the cognitive access stories the protagonist was engaged in an attention-demanding activity (i.e., playing a silent video game) vhen information about the desired object's location was presented auditorially
(attentional focus stories) and in two cognitive access storie the protagonist saw the object's location, but searched in the wrong location following a delay (delayed search stories). In addition, in one attentional focus
story and one delayed search story, the desired object remained in a
single container throughout the story (single location), and in one attentional focus story and one delayed search story, the object ,·a placed in
one container and then moved to another location (change of location).
In the attentional focus stories, the character who either (a) hid the
desired object or (b) moved the object to a new location 'erba. ) described the object's location, but the protagonist vas pla •ing a · ent
video game, rather than paying attention to what the other characer sard
(and the protagonist could not see the object being hidden becau~ 1-Jer
back was turned). Thus, in the attentional focus stories the 'erbal message about the object's location was physically audible but not attended.
In the delayed search stories, the protagonist her elf either (a) hid the
desired object in the morning or (b) hid the object and then mo ed it to

Children's Cognitive Explanations

385

a new location. Then after spending the day at school, the protagonist
returned and looked for the object in the incorrect location, as if he or
she had forgotten where it had last been seen.

Procedure
Each participant was tested individually in a single 20-min session bv
two experimenters. The two warm-up stories preceded the eight stories
comprising the main task. The warm-up stories were presented in counterbalanced order across participants and the eight stories in the main
task were presented in random order. Each story was acted out using the
house and/or the school, one or two dolls, two containers serving as
potential hiding places, and an object to be hidden. During each story,
participants watched the object being hidden in one of the t:\'\'0 containers. Thus, participants always knew the hidden object's location.
At the end of each story, the protagonist stated a desire for the
hidden object and then moved toward the correct hiding place in the
warm-up stories or the incorrect hiding place in the main-task stories.
Just as the protagonist was about to open the container, the stof)
stopped and participants were asked a sequence of questions:
1. The behavior explanation question asked participants to explain
why the protagonist looked for the hidden object in a particular location
(e.g., "Why did Tom look for the cat behind the black door?").
2. The belief question assessed participants' ability to judge the
Protagonist's belief about the desired object's location (e.g., "\\'here
does Tom think the cat is?"). For the warm-up stories the protagonist
appeared to hold a true belief about the object's location, but for the
eight main-task stories the protagonist appeared to hold a false belief.
3. The beliei explanation question asked participanb to explain the
source of the belief that they had attributed to the protagonist (e.g.,
either "Why does Tom think the cat is behind the red door?" or "\Vhy
does Tom think the cat is behind the black door?", depending on the
belief the participant previously attributed to the doll).
4. The reality question assessed participants' knowledge of the desired object's true location (e.g., "Where is the cat really?"). For the t\\·o
Warm-up stories .. the procedure ended here. In the main task, the procedure continued.
5. For the tv.·o auditOr)' stories and the two attentional focus stories,
the verbalization question a se sed participants' memory oi the second
story character's remark about the hidden object's location (e.g., "\\'hat
did Sarah sav to Tom?").
6. For each of the eight main-task stories, participants \\ere asked a
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false belief explanation question. For the two visual stories and the two
delayed search stories, participants were asked why the protagonist did
not think the desired object was in its true location {e.g., .,Ho' come
Cathy doesn't think the gum is in the red drav.·er?"). Likewise, for the
two auditory and the two attentional focus stories, participants 'ere
asked to explain why the protagonist did not think the desired ob:ect
was in the true location even though the other character had said it \\as
there (e.g., "If Sarah said it was behind the red door, ho ,. come :on'
doesn't think the cat is behind the red door?").
Participants were never informed about the accurac: oi their responses, nor were the contents of either container e er re\ealed. For
eight stories in the main task, the belief question. the realit: question,
and the verbalization question were used as controls to screen participants who failed to understand or remember the stories accurately. n '
participant who answered one or more of these control questions incorrectly for three or more stories was excluded from the anal~ es.
·ing
this criterion, two young 4-year-olds and two old 4- ear-olds \ere e eluded from the analyses reported later. In the remaining ample, all 12
adults, 17 5-year-olds, 17 old 4-year-olds, and 13 •oun -1-.~ar-olds
answered the control questions correctly for all 8 stories; 3 5-. ear-ofd.::,
1 old 4-year-old, and 3 young 4-year-olds answered correct!; for 7
stories, and 1 young 4-year-old answered correct! • ior 6 tories.

RESULTS

Coding
Participants' response~ were coded both a. spontaneou explan ion;
and as complete prompted e planations. Spontaneou_ , planatso
..-ere
answers given to the behav1or explanation question, vhich 1\ ~ the fi st
que~tion a ked after each story. Complete prompted eJ plana so
~
compo ites including an·wers given to the behavior e. planatson, belief
e. planation, and false belief e plane lion quest1ons folio 'in each .to '
Three basic response categorie~ \\ere u. ed to cod both _pontane·
ous and complete prompted e planation-, ior the ''arm-up and main I ;;
stories: knowledge state e planation , per eptual
urce e. p anati0°'
and cognitive source explan<llions. Knowleci~e _tat • e p anation: con·
sisted of references to (a) th protagonist' ignorance r
rdin the deother
sired object's location or the \erbal information pro ided b)
character or ~b the protagonbt':. fal
belief con
ob'e<:t',
location {e.g., " he do n't know that it' in th b
th 10· '
it' in there, but it'- not"). Per eptual source

Children's Cognith·e Explanations

387

ences to perceptual sources of the protagonist's ignorance or false belief
and thus included (a) references to the fact that the protagonist had seen
or heard about the object's location or had placed the object in its
hiding place, (b) suggestions that the hidden object usually was kept in
the location where the protagonist was searching for it, or (c) mention of
the fact that the protagonist had not seen or heard about the object's
location (or change of location) or was absent when the object was
hidden or moved (e.g., "Because he saw it in the blue jar, but Susan put
it in the black jar," "That's \\here he usually keeps it," "He didnt hear
her with the things on his ears"). Cogniti\ e source explanations were
references to cognitive factors contnbuting to the protagonist's ignorance
or false belief. Cognitive source explanations included (a) forgetting explanations: suggestions that the protagonist had forgotten the hidden
object's location (e.g., "She forgot that it was in the blue one"), or (b)
focus of activity explanations: suggestions that the protagonist was engaged in or attending to some other activity \vhen iniormation about the
hidden object's location was available (e.g., "He didn't hear her sa~ it
was in the red box because he was too busy playing a game," • Because
he didn't think because he wa playing the video game").
In addition to three basic response categories, rea/it\' responses
mentioned the hidden object's true location, desire responses stated the
Protagonist's desire ior the hidden object, and not there responses mentioned that the object wa~ not 1n the lo ation where the protagonist had
searched. All other responses were coded as "other," udon't know," or
"no response" and were not included in the iollowmg analy~e-;. PartJc.iPanh could give more than one category oi re~ponse for each storv. For
example, a participant might refer both to the protagoni'lt's ignorance
(knowledge state) and to the protagoni t's forgetting (cognitive ..:ource).
The second author coded all respon.,e ·. A a reliabilit , check, an indePendent judge who was blind to the purpo-,e of the ~tudy coded all
responses to all eight stori
for five participants 111 each age group
(Cohen's 1\ .86 for both .;pontaneou and .omplete prompted e.·planatJon . Di agreement) \\ere re-.olved by di-.cus-.•on .

=

Scoring

pontan ous e planations were .., ored {or eac.h oi the eight .~tories
by giving each parti ~ ipant a "wre of 0 or 1 for each r -.pon e c.ategory.
lhat i , if a
to th beha
Pant receh
Partiupant'

parti ipant gave a knowledge .;tate explanation m re-:ponc:e
10r e ·planation que.. tion for a particular story, the partedI a knowled
tate s or of 1 for that _tory. Oth rwi e, the
knO\ ledg <>tat ~ or for that tory va 0. likewi e, par-
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Table 1. Mean Number (and Standard Deviation) of Spontaneou Explanations
for Each Category by Age and Informational Access

Informational access

Young
4-year-olds
n = 17

Old
4-year-olds
n = 78

5-year-olds
n = 20

Adults
n = 12

Knowledge state explanations
0.72 (1.07) 0.95 (0.94) 1.17 10.84)

Cognitive stories

1.00 (1 .32)
1.29 (1 .31)

Perceptual stories
Cognitive stories

Perceptual source e\planations
0.88 (1.27) 1.56 (1.34) 2.00 (1.17) 2.83 (0.84)
0.47(0.94) 1.00(1.14
1.60(1.14) 1.83(0.58)

Perceptual stories

Perceptual stories
Cognitive stories

0.18 (0.53)
0.18 (0.39)

1.06 (1.26)

0.55 (0.83)

0.-!2 (0.67)

Cognitive source e;;.p/anations
0.11 (0.47) 0.45 (0.76) 0 17 (0 39)

0.72 (0.90)

1.50 (1.61)

2.08 (0.79)

Reality e;;.planations
Perceptual stories

0.47 (0.87)

0.11 (0.32)

Cognitive stories

0.35 (0.49)

0.28 (0.75)

0.15 (0.37)
0.05 (0.22)

0.00 (0.()())
0 00 (0.()())

Perceptual stories
Cognitive stories

0.18 (0.53)
0.24 (0.66)

Desire explanations
0.18 (0.53) 0.00 (0.00)
0.12 (0.48) 0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)

Perceptual stories

0.64 (1.11)

Cognitive stories

0.41 (1.00)

" ot there"' re~pon).(?S
0.44 (1.15) 0.10 (0.31)
0.50 (1.15) 0.10 (0.31)

0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)

Other responses
Perceptual stories

0.47 (1.01)

0.39 (0.70)

0.30 (0.73)

Cognitive stories

0.41 (0.71)

0.17(0.51)

0.20 {0.93)

Perceptual stories

0.29 (0.77)

No respon:-e
0.50 (0.79) 0.45 (1.05)

Cogniti\e stories

0.47 (1.07)

0.39 (0.70)

0.28 (0.77)
0.01 (0.32)

0.50 (0.89)

Note. The number po~5ible per cell is 4.

ticipants received perceptual source and cogniti~e ource _cor o· 0 or
l for each story. The scores for each oi the four ·torie \ i hin th h o
informational access conditions (perceptual acce _ and c<Y.!ni i e acce .,
stories) were ummed. Thus, participants' kno \~ed
_ a e pJan ion
cores for each of the I\\O conditions ranged from 0 to , depeodin on
whether thev gave a knowledge state e. planation in r pon· o 0, 1, _,
3. or 4 of torie in each condition.
or for
plan ron
categories \.\ere calculat d in a similar manner.
or ed h
explanation cate ory are pre.:. nted in Table 1.
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Table 2. Mean umber (and Standard Deviation)
of Complete Prompted Explanations for Each Category
by Age and Informational Access

Informational access

Young
4-vear-olds
n = 17

Perceptual stories
Cognitive stories

1.59 (1 .46)
1.65 (1 .41)

Perceptual stories
Cognitive stories

1.71 (1.61)
1.35 (1.32)

Perceptual stories

0.53 (0.87)

Cogniti\e stories

1.00 (1.46)

Perceptual stories
Cognitive stories

0.59 (1 .12)

Perceptual stories

0.65 (1.32)

Cognitive stories

0.47 (1.07)

0.05 (0.22)
0.28 (0.75)
De 1re e\planation..,
0.10(0.311
0.22 (0.73)
0.00 (0.00)
0.67 (0.91)

Perceptual tories
Cogniti\e stories

0.64(1.11)

0.50 (1 20)

0.53 (0.87)

Old
5-vear-o/d
4-rear-olds
n =20
n = 18
Knowledge state explanations
1.25 (.97)
0.83 (1 .04)
0.75 (0.91)
1.17(1.15)
Perceptual source e\planation
3.15 (1 .27)
2.50 (1.46)
2.05 (1.15)
1.78 (1.17)
Cogniti1 e source explanations
1.10(1.16)
0.44 (0.86)
2.80 (1.36)
1.56(1.15)
Reality explanations
0.30 (0.47)
0.17 (0.38)

Adults
n = 12

1.42 (1.00)
0.50 (0.67)
3.58 (0.67)
2.00 (0.60)
0.83 (0.84)
3.33 (0./8)
0 00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0 08 (0.24)
0.00 (0.00)

, ot there"' re:;ponc.es

0.41 (1.00)

0.50(1.15)

0.15 (0.37)
0.10 (0 31)

0 00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)

Perceptual storie

1.12 (1.27)

0.28 (0./7)

Cognitive <;tories

0.82 (1.01)

Other re~pon. e~
0.45 (0.76)
1.06 (1.47)
0.35 {0.931
1 67 (0.91)

0.18 (0.53)

0.22 (0.43)

0.25 (0.91)

0.17 (0.38)

0.05 (0.22)

0 17 (0.40)

No re.pon•e
0.00 (0.00)

1.1ndard d \ 1ation~ ar m parenthe

Complete prompted e planations ''ere scored ior each of the ei ht
stories b • giving each participant a core oi 1 ior a particular e planation cat gor • if the participant gave that t •p of explanation m re;;pon-e
to either the b havior planation question, the beli i e planation qu~lion, or the ial
belief e. ·planation qu tion. 1ean cor _ for each
c tegory are pr nted in Tabl 2.
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RESULTS
Overview of Analyses

The primary goal of the present study was to examine '' hether children make appropriate use of explanations that referred to the protagonists' perceptual experiences and explanations that reierred to the
protagonists' cognitive activities. Knowledge state explanations are appropriate for both perceptual access and cognitive access stories. HO\\ ever,
perceptual source explanations would be more plausible ior the perceptual access stories, but cognitive source explanations would be more
plausible for the cognitive access stories. Therefore, Age (young .f 's. o1d
4 vs. 5 vs. adult) x Informational access (perceptual access vs. cogn tr\e
access stories) x Explanation category (knowledge state ' . perceptual
source vs. cognitive source), ANOVAs (with informational acces and
explanation category as a within-subjects variables) were performed
separately for the spontaneous and complete prompted explanations.
Because each A OVA revealed a significant Age x Informational
access x Explanation category interaction (spontaneous explanations, F
(6, 126) = 6.01, p < .001, MSE = 0.60; complete prompted e planations,
F (6, 126) = 5.95, p < .001, MSE = 0.80), for each of the basic e. planation categories, an Age x Informational access A, OVA wa performed
separately for spontaneous and complete prompted e planatron.:.
To fully examine participants' ability to use cognitive iactor to
explain a protagonist's incorrect search, cogniti\e ource e planations
were iurther subdivided into two more speciiic categorie-, for-etting
explanations and focus of activity explanations. For eac1 0' these two
more specific response categories, we performed Age x t ' • type (delayed search vs. attentional focus) A, OVAs (with sto t\ ..,e - a . •ithinsubject variable) for both spontaneous and complete prompte<
explanations. These analyses allowed us to im e ti ate the e ent to
which participants (a) used forgetting to e plain erroneous ~earches rn
the delayed search stories but not the attentional iocus torie:, and (b)
used focus of activity to explain erroneous searche. in the atten ional
focus stories but not the delayed search stories.
KnowledBe state explanations. For spontaneous e planation~, an
Age x Informational access (4 x 2) A, OVA periormed on the 'nodedge state explanation scores did not yield significant main e·-ecb o a.... e
or informational acce s, but there was a significant Age lnionna ional
access interaction, F (3, 63) = 3.26, p < .05, 15f = 0.60. 'nO\\Ied~e
state explanations tended to decrease with age for cogniti\ accesries, but not ior perceptual access stories. 1ore speo Jcall ',
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year-olds gave significantly more knowledge state explanations ior cognitive access stories than did adults, Tukey H50 = 0.86, p < .05. The
pattern of results was similar for complete prompted explanations.
For complete prompted kno\1\ ledge state explanations, an Age x
Informational access (4 x 2) A OVA did not yield significant main effects of age or informational access; however, the Age x Informational
access interaction was significant, F (3,63) = 2.79, p <.OS. A.15E = 0.85.
There were no significant age differences for the perceptual access stories. For cognitive access stories, young 4-year-olds ga\e signiiicantlv
more knowledge state explanations than did adults, Tuke)- H50 = 1.02,
P< .05.
Perceptual source explanations. An Age x Informational access 4 x
2) A OVA performed on the spontaneous perceptual source explanation scores yielded significant main effects of age, F (3, 63) = 1.02, p <
.001. A-15£ = 2.07, and informational access, F (1, 63) = 2-L16, p < .001,
M5E = 0.42. Young 4-year-olds gave significantly fewer perceptual
source explanations than did 5-year-olds or adults. Tukey H50 = 0.95, p
< .05. In addition, perceptual source explanations were used more often
for the perceptual access stories than ior the cogniti\ e access stories.
For the complete prompted explanations, an Age x Informational
access (4 x 2) A OVA performed on perceptual source expianations
yielded significant effects of age, F (3, 63) = 4.14, p < .01 \1 E = 2.42,
and informational access. F (1, 63) = 41.18, p < .001, \I E = i\65.
However, these effects were qualified b~ an Age x lniormat1onat acces.
interaction, F (3 ,63) = 3.08, p < .05, M5E = 0.65. Fi\e-year-olds and
adult gave significantly more perceptual source explanations for perceptual access stories than for cognitive storie , but -l-year-olds' explanation did not vary by story type, Tukey HSO = 0.89, p < .05.
Cogniti1 e source eAplanations. For spontaneous explanations. an
Age x Informational acce s (4 x 2) A OVA performed on the cognitive
source explanation -;core yielded ignificant main efiects of age, F (3,
63) = 6.14, p < .001 \15£ = 1.1 0, and informational acce_ s, F (1, 63) =
45.67, p < .001, A.15E = 0.46, and a -;igniiicant Age x Informational
access interact1on, F ,3,63) = 9.89, p < .001, ,\1 E = 0.46. For perceptual
acce-,s stories there were no signiiicant age difierence-.. Fhe-vear-old~
and c dults gave cognitive source explanations significantly more oiten
for cognitive access stories than for perceptual acce:.s stories, Tu ev
H. 0 = 0.75, but 4-year-olcJ..' explanation" did not vary ior the l\\O type
of _torie ....
similar patt rn of re-;uft _v~.a-. tound for complete prompted e planation~. n t\ge Informational acce-..; (4 x 2) At-.:OVA performed on
compl tt:> prompted co >nitive .ource e. -planation .core: •i lded ..igniii-
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cant effects of age, F (3, 63) = 7.43, p < .001, MSE = 1.92 and lnrormational access, F (1, 63) = 111.76, p < .001, MSE = 0.56, and a significant
Age x Informational access interaction, F (3, 63) = 9.57, p < .001, \15£ =
0.56. As was the case for spontaneous explanations. among 5-~ ear-o!ds
and adults cognitive source explanations were significantly more common for cognitive access stories than for perceptual access stories. However, for complete prompted explanations, unlike spontaneous explanations, old 4-year-olds also gave significantly more cognitive .ource
explanations for cognitive access stories, Tukey HSD = 0.83, p < .05.
In summary, examination of knowledge state explanations indicated
that explanations referring to the protagonist's ignorance or false belief
decreased with age for the cognitive access stories. By 5 ears of age,
children's performance was very similar to adults' performance. Examination of perceptual source explanations indicated that when the protagonist did not receive perceptual information about the de·ired object's
location (perceptual access stories), 5-year-olds and adults usually e:'\.plained the protagonist's incorrect search in terms oi the presence or
absence of perceptual experience. In contrast, when the protagonist
searched incorrectly despite having been exposed to information about
the object's location (cognitive stories), references to perceptual experience were less frequent and did not increase with age. Thu:, vi<h increased age, the use of perceptual source explanation· became more
differentiated. Examination of cognitive source e planations indicated
that references to cognitive factors such as forgetting or focu- of acti,·itv
increased with age and were used specifically to explain vh}' the protagonist searched incorrectly despite having been expo.ed to mformation
about the desired object's location. Thus, cognitive .:ource e planations
were used frequently by 5-year-olds and adults in re.5pon.: to cogniU\e
stories, but were rarely given in response to perceptual _tories b an; a e
group.
Forgetting and focus of activit}'. Response · for cognithe acce5.:: stories \\ere examined in more detail by comparing the u.:e of forgetting
and focus oi activity explanations for delayed search and attent•onal
focus stories. Forgetting e. ·planations were sugg ·tion~ hat l e prota onist had forgotten the hidden object's location. Focu. of act1 ·it, e plan.ttions mentioned that the protagonist wa engaged m or attendin to
some other activity when information about ,the hidden ob"ect' locat1on
was a ailable. Separate analvses were performed for pon aneou- and
complete prompted e planation~.
To examine the use oi spontaneous forgetting e plana i
pant: were given a score ranging from 0 to 2 for th
o dela
storie.. and a 5core ranging irom 0 to ::! for th l\\0 a
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Table 3. Mean umber (and Standard Deviation)
of Complete Prompted Forgetting and Focus of Activity Explanation
by Age and Story Type
Young
Old
Adults
4-rear-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-old
Informational access
n = 17
n - 18
n = 20
n = 12
Spontaneous forgetting explanations
Delayed search stories
0.12 (0.33) 0.61 (0.78) 0.75 (0.91) 1 .33 0.65)
Attentional focus stories 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.20 (0.52) 0.00 (0.001
Complete prompted forgetting explanation~
Delayed earch stories
0.47 (0.80) 0.89 (0.90!
1.30 (0.86) 1.83 (0.39)
Attentional focus stories 0.18 (0.53) 0.06 (0.24) 0.30 10.73) 0.08 (0.29)
Spontaneou.~ focus of acti\·itv explanations

Delayed search stories
Attentional focus stories

0.00 (0.00)
0.06 (0.24)

0.00 (0.00)
0.06 (0.24)

0.00 (0.00!
0.55 (0.69)

0.00 (0.00>
0.67 !0.49)

Complete prompted focus of activit\· explanations
Delayed earch stories
0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
0.05 (.22)
0.00 (0.00)
Attentional iocus tories 0.41 (0.80) 0.61 (0.78) 1.25 (0.91 l
1.42 (0.67)
.\'ote The number po~sible per cell b 2. Standard deviation~ are in parenthe e-..

Storie . Table 3 shows the mean number oi forgetting explanations for the
1:\vo type of storie . An Age x Story tvpe A 10VA yielded igniiicant
effects of age, F (3, 63) = 5 SO p < .005, MSE = 0.36, and :.lory twe, F
(1 ,63} = 50.73, p < .001, 1 E = 0.24. Hm.vever, these efiect were
qualified by an ge x tory type interaction, F (3, 63) = 7.41, p < .001,
,\.1 E = 0.24. Old 4-~ear-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults ga' e forgetting explanation-; igniiicantl~· more often in re~ponse to del a\ ed -earch .tories
than in respon. to attentional iocu., -;torie~, Tukey H D =0.54, p < .05.
similar pattern oi re.,ults wa found tor complete prompted forgetting e planation·. n ge
torv tyl) (4 x 2) , OV :ielded _ignificant effe t.; oi age, F (3, 63) =4 2 p < .01, M E =0.61, and ~tory t pe,
F(l, 63) = 9G.44, p < .001, \1 [ = 0.29. HO\\E'\er, th. efrec~ \\ere
qualified b an ge x tory typ mteraction. F (3, 63) = 8.79, p < .001,
,\JSE == 0.- . Older 4-year-old~, 5-year-old~, and aduiL u_ed forgettino
e. planation· sign iii antly mor ofttn for del a\~ sec rch _tori than for
attentional iocu" o;;tories. Tuke • H 0 = O.St, p < .05.
lik '' i , to amin th u...c of fo u of activity e planation_, for
l)lanation and ompl t prompted e planation_,
both ~pontan u
Parti ip nt \\ re gi,en < ~cor ranging from 0 to 2 ior the t '0 d Ia ed
_ arch tori
nd a ., ore ran ing from 0 to _ for th l\ o attentional
10
u tori . T bl
ho
th rn an num r of f u of a tivit ' e pia-
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nations for the two types of stories. For spontaneous explanation-, an
Age x Story type (4 x 2) A OVA yielded significant effects oi age, F (3,
63) = 7.64, p < .01, MSE = 1.11, and story type, f(1, 63 = 30.71, p <
.001, MSE = 0.11. However, these effects were quai if:ed b\ an ge x
Story type interaction, F (3, 63) = 7 .64, p < .005, 'v1SE = 1.11. Fi\ e-\ earaids and adults gave significantly more focus of acti\ in exp:a11atlons for
attentional focus stories than they did for delayed search stories. Tu ey
HSO = 0.36, p < .05. A similar pattern of results was found ior cofllplete
prompted explanations. An Age x Story type (4 x 2~ A:-\OVA periormed
on complete prompted focus of activity explanations yielded igniiicant
effects of age, F (3, 63) = 6.35, p < .01, MSE = 0.31, and storv type, F (1,
63) = 73.54, p < .001, MSE = 0.35. Howe"er, these effect \\ere qua fied by an Age x Story type interaction, F (3, 63~ = -L97, p < .005, \' E =
0.35. Five-year-olds and adults used focus of activit\• e. ·planatk·'l · gnificantly more often for the attentional focus stories than for the delaved
search stories, Tukey HSO = 0.66, p < .05.
In summary, the use of forgetting to explain incorrect search increased with age. Older 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults u:ed for etting explanations specifically to explain errors when the protagonist had
been exposed to information about the object's location, but -earched
following a delay. In contrast, if the protagonist had been en aged in
another attention-demanding activity at the time information about the
desired object's location was provided, 5-year-olds and adul irequently
referred to focus of activity to explain the protagonist' ancorrect search,
but they did not use focus of activity explanations otherwise.

DISCUSSION
The present results indicate that some elaboration_ o- the ~imple
belief-desire framework begin to emerge durino the late pr _ hool ears.
The young 4-year-olds often provided some t pe of mentaiLt•c e. planation for the protagonist's incorrect search. That is. more than half o· their
explanations consisted of reierences to the protagoni.::t'.:: ignorance, fal5e
belief, lack oi perceptual experience, or desire for the hidden object.
Like\-vise, older 4-year-olds' explanations frequent! • referred o the protagoni t' knO\.vledge state (i.e., ignorance or false belief). Th ul
are in keeping with the results reported b · Bartsch and tellman 1 89,
and demonstrate use of the simple belie -de::,ire fram o . B 5 }ear.
of age, children often referred to the perceptual or cogni i
-ource of
the protagonist's knowled e state. Moreo er, 5- ·ear-old_ de on rated
fie. ibility in their rea _oning. That is, the . ga\e peroep ual o cogni i e
. ource e planations dep nding upon the details of the -•tuat1on m 'hich
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a mistaken action occurred. When the protagonist did not receive perceptual information about the desired object's location, both 5-vear-olds
and adults explained the protagonist's incorrect search by referring to
protagonist's perceptual experience. In contrast, \\hen the protagon 1st
had been presented with perceptual information about the desired object's location, but nevertheless searched incorrectly, both 5-year-olds
and adults referred to cognitive factors, such as forgetting or focus of
activity, to explain the protagonist's mistake. Furthermore, children and
adults used different types of cognitive explanations in different circumstances. When the protagonist searched following a delay, older 4-}earolds, 5-year-olds, and adults explained errors by saving that the
protagonist had forgotten the destred object's location. Hm\ever, ii the
protagonist had been engaged in an attention-demanding activitv at the
time information about the desired object's location was provided, 5year-olds and adults frequently suggested that the protagonist had not
been paying attention or had been engaged in some other activity when
the information was provided.
Wellman's (1990) distinction bef\.veen young children's simple belief-desire scheme for understanding human action and a later-developing, more elaborated explanatory framevvork is useful for interpreting the
results of the pre ent study. Within the more elaborated framewor ·, a
greater variety of mental states and processe· are differentiated and an
increased number oi causal connections among these concept_- are represented. According to Wellman {1990), \\ ithin the simple belief-de~ ire
framework, perceptions cause beliefs, but within the elaborated framework, cognitive activities, such as reasoning, imagining. and remembering, also may influence beliefs. Children's references to forgetting or
attention to e. plain mistaken actions and false beliefs sugge·ts that some
conception of cognitive activities begins to emerge bv -t 1h or 5 •ear of
age. Moreo\·er, 5-year-olds' differential use oi forgetting and attention
expl,mation~ ugge ts that they ha\ e begun to appreciate that each proce s relates to perception and beltei different! •: Attending selectively ma '
result in a failure to encode perceptuall ' available information, but forgetting may re..,ult in the los~ of information that was encoded previously. Thus, 5-year-old.;' early wncepts oi cognitive acti\'itie. -uch a-:;
attention and iorgetting appear to be coordinated with concepts of perception, knowledge, belief, and action. However, children'-. awarene-.s
of the phenomena oi iorgetting and attendmg doe · not nec.e .sarilv indicate that th v conceive of th mimi itself a~ an entit ' that acti el •
interprets information.
E: tim.:lt oi the age at which children begin to conceive of th mind
a an activ .gent varY widel • in th literature. Perner and Davie- (1991)
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claimed that 4-year-olds have such a conception, but Chandler 1988),
Pillow (1988), and Taylor (1988) all proposed that before 6 or - years of
age children regard knowledge acquisition as a passive process. In addition, although Wellman and Hickling (1994) suggested that children begin to conceive of the mind as an active agent around 8 to 10 years of
age, Schwanenflugel, Fabricius, and Alexander (1994) argued that a constructivist conception of the mind develops sometime after 10 vears of
age. In the present study, conceptions of forgetting and attention began to
emerge around 4 1/2 or 5 years of age. Thus, to organize the present
findings and previous results into a coherent developmental sequence, it
is necessary to examine these discrepant claims. These discrepant vie\\S
of development can be reconciled by considering the different criteria
that have been used to determine when children can be credited with an
understanding of the mind as actively processing information.
Perner and Davies (1991) suggested that understanding of the mind
as an active interpreter of information is achieved when a child recognizes that a listener may evaluate the credibility of a message b · comparing it with the listener's existing knowledge. In their stud , 4-vear-olds
correctly predicted, for example, that Mary would believe Peter's assertion that a plastic brick was real if she had not touched ·r. Ho '€\ er, if
Mary had touched the brick and discovered it was fake, 4- ear-old
predicted that Mary would reject Peter's assertion as incorrect. Thu_,
4-year-olds understood that information may be accepted a· true or rejected as false, depending on whether it matches a person's pre ·iou_ly
held knowledge. In the present study, 4-year-olds' references to forgetting
indicate that 4-year-olds know that information may be retained or lost,
and 5-year-olds' references to attention indicate that 5-. ear-old ·now
that information may be attended to or 1gnored. Therefore, around ... to 5
years of age, children appreciate that mental activities influence the acquisition and retention of knowledge by selecting .vhat iniormation L
encoded or represented.
Chandler (1988), Pillow (1988), and Taylor (1988) all propo.ed that
children do not have an active conception of the mind until 6 or I :ear·
of age. These researchers used children's under.tandino that prior
knowledge can be used to make inferences that go beyond immediatelv
perceptible information as the criterion for crediting child en \'lth a
conception of the mind as an active interpreter. That i . children een ually realize that mental activities not only influence what information 1;;
repre ented, but also influence how that information L repre en ed Pillow, 1995). For example, Pillow (1991) reported tha 6- ar-o d_, unli ·e
4-year-olds, appreciated that an observ r's e pectation: abou ano her
person might iniluence how the observer interpreL that per on•- action~-
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Six-year-olds recognized that an observer who witnessed another person
holding a toy in ambiguous circumstances might interpret that person's
action as taking the toy or giving the toy, depending upon whether the
observer was biased to expect the other person to behave in an antisocial or prosocial manner.
Although 6-year-olds are becoming aware of activities that create a
representation that goes beyond the information directly available, later
in childhood, conceptions of cognitive activities become increasingly
abstract. Thus, Wellman and Hickling (1994) distinguished between
knowing about mental activity and conceptualizing an independent active mind. They proposed that children regard beliefs as actively constructed through inference and interpretation before children conceive oi
the mind itself as an independent, active entity. In support of this view,
Wellman and Hickling (1994) reported that although 6-year-olds generally understood metaphors that personify natural or mechanical phenomena (e.g., "The \.vind was hO\.\'Iing"), 6-year-olds typically did not understand metaphors that personify the mind as an active agent 'e.g., " Her
rnind was racing"). Eight- and 10-year-olds usually understood personified metaphors for the mind, and many 10-year-olds also produced them.
Likewise, Schwanenflugel et al. (1994) argued that although 8- and
10-year-olds may possess some knowledge of mental activities, the _
have not yet organized their knowledge of mental phenomena into a
constructivist conception of the mind. When asked to rate the Similarity
of various selective attention, recognition , and comprehension activities.
8- and 10-year-olds did not organize the activities into three di ·tinct
clusters. Schwanenflugel et al. (1994) suggested that children failed to
distinguish among these activities because children iocused on the inPuts and outcome" oi each task rather than the cognitive activities intervening between inputs and outputs. In contra _t, Sch\\anenilugel et al.
(~ 994) found that adult.; distinguished among a variety of mental acth·ihes and organized their knowledge of the mind in terms of similaritie:
and differences among cognitive activities. Thus, Schwanenflugel et al.
(1994) conclude<i that knowledge of the organization of cognithe acti •ities de\ elop ... sometime betwe n 10 ~ears of age and adulthood. The
results reported by Wellman and Hickling (1l94) and chwanenilugel et
al. 09'4) trace the development of increa~ingly ab tract conception~ of
~ental activity. By 8 to 10 , ears oi age, children '.; knowledge of cognitive activitie.-; may be organized into a conception oi the mind a~ an
aaive agent, c1nd b , adulthood a conception oi relationship among
c1istin t mental clCtiviti s mav emerge.
Th und r tanding of cognithe activitie.-; evident m 4-lf.? and 5- •earold ' e ·planations of another per_on' mJ.stake-. in the pr -ent ~ tud may
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· provide an early foundation for the more abstract conceptions of mental
activity that de\'elop later. For example, children's av:areness of di tinctions among cognitive processes appears to increase gradually during
middle and late childhood. Thus. 6- and 7-vear-olds make ~me distinc-
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Appendix
\Varm-up stories
Visual: Here's Sally. She has some crayons. Sally puts her crayons in
the red box. Then Bill comes over. Bill says, "Sally, let's color." Sally
wants the crayons. Sally looks for the crayons in the red box.
Auditory: Here's Sam. Sam has a picture. Sam puts the picture in the
blue box. Here comes Emily. Sam says, "Emily, the picture is in the blue
box." Emily wants to see the picture. Emily looks for the picture in the
blue box.
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Perceptual access stories
Visual, single location: Here's Cathy. It's morning and she's going to
school. She sits at her desk all day listening to her teacher. Loo , here
comes David. He has some gum. David puts the gum in the red dra\\er
and then he leaves. Look, here comes Cathy. She's coming home irom
school. Cathy wants some gum. She looks for the gum in the green
drawer.
Visual, change of location: Here's Richard. He has a toy car. Richard puts his toy car in the blue jar. ow, Richard is going to school. He
sits at his desk all day listening to his teachers. Look, here comes Susan.
Susan moves the car to the black jar and then she leaves. Look, here
comes Richard. He's coming home from school. Richard wants his car.
He looks for the car in the blue jar.
Auditory, single location: Here's Betty. She's listening to music on
her headphones. It's very loud. Look, here comes Sam. He ha ~ome
candy. Sam puts the candy in the green drawer, and savs, " Betty, I put
the candy in the green drawer." Then Sam leaves. Later, Betty wants
some candy. She looks for the cookies in the yellov: drawer.
Auditory, change of location: Here's Tom. He has a to\ cat. Tom
puts his toy cat behind the black door. ow he sits down and hsten to
music on his headphones. It's very loud. Look, here comes Sarah. Sarah
moves the cat to behind the red door and says, "Tom, I put the cat
behind the red door." Then Sarah leaves. Tom's all done li tening to his
music. Tom wants his cat. He looks for the cat behind the blac'· door.
Cognitive access stories
Delayed search, single location: Here's Debbie. She ha a ball.
Debbie puts her ball in the blue drawer. ow Debbie s :'o,ng to chool.
She sits at her desk all day listening to her teachers. 'ow chool j- o ·er
and Debbie is coming home from school. Debbie wants the ball. She
looks for the ball in the red drawer.
Delayed search, change of location: Here's Carl. He has a to • dog.
Carl puts the dog in the white bowl. Now, Carl moves the dog o the
green bowl. ow Carl is going to school. He sit at hi: des · all day
listening to his teachers. Now school is over and Carl i coming home
from school. Carl wants the toy dog. He looks for the dog in the \'hite
bowl.
Attentional focus, single location: Here's Peter. Peter j· pia, .,~., a
video game that he really loves to play. Look, here comes Sharo . ~e
has some Legos. Sharon puts the Legos in the red box and sa,-, ·r~ •..:'
put the Legos 1n the red box." Then Sharon leave .• 'o v Peter i done
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playing his video game and he wants the Legos. Peter looks for the Legos
in the brown box.
Attentional focus, change of location: Here's Mary. She has a hat.
Mary puts the hat in the white box. Now Mary is going to play a video
game that she really loves to play. Look, here comes Steve. Steve moves
the hat to the blue box and says, "Mary, I put the hat in the blue box."
Then Steve leaves. Now Mary is done playing her video game and she
wants the hat. Mary looks for the hat in the white box.

